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Abstract 
The main result of this paper is that the nultiple equilibrium 
problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private value models 
if agents do not use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium. 
We show that in such settings, any incentive compatible allocation 
can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism. We 
derive a general recessary condition for unique implementation 
which implies that the positive result for private value models 
applies with considerably less generality to common value settings 
and to situations in which an agent's information does rot index 
the agent's preferences. 
1. Introduction 
Institutions play a fundamental role in the organization of economic, 
political, and social activity. A central problem in the theory of 
institutions is the characterization of outcomes which can be achieved by 
institutions. Mechanism design theory studies precisely this problem. 
A basic principle of mechanism design with incomplete information is that 
any outcome which is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome to a mechanism 
(institution) must satisfy an incentive compatibility condition ( Harris and 
Townsend [1981], Myerson [1979]). Implementation theory seeks to characterize 
those outcomes which are unique equilibrium outcomes to mechanisms, and 
incentive compatibility �s thus a necessary condition for implementation. In 
this paper, we show that with a slight refinement of Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium, incentive compatibility is also sufficient for implementation in 
a large class of models. Our main result, is that in a large class of models, 
for any incentive, compatible allocation there exists an institution to which 
the allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome. 
Since an incentive compatible allocation can always be made an equilibrium 
outcome to a direct mechanism, the heart of the implementation problem is to 
design more complex institutions to which there are no other equilibrium 
outcomes. In attempting to resolve problems of multiple equilibria in games, 
two approaches have been followed in the literature. One approach attempts to 
eliminate multiple equilibria by refining the notion of equilibrium (e.g., 
Banks and Sobel [1987], Cho and Kreps [1987], Grossman and Perry [1986],
Kohlberg and Mertens [1986], Selten [1975]). The second approach asks 
whether, given an equilibrium concept, the mechanism being played by the 
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agents can be designed so as to eliminate undesirable equilibria while 
retaining desirable ones (see Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin [1979], Maskin 
[1986], Postlewaite [1986], Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986], Palfrey and 
Srivastava [1985, 1987]).
This paper continues a line of inquiry followed by Moore and Repullo 
(1986] and Palfrey and Srivastava (1986] which merges these two approaches and 
asks whether flexibility in mechanism design together with a refined 
equilibrium concept can resolve the multiplicity problem. Earlier 
applications of this approach to specific complete information settings can be 
found in Crawford [1979], Moulin [1979], and Reichelstein [1985]. Our result 
is that in a large class of settings with incomplete information, all 
multiplicity problems can be resolved with an extremely mild refinement of 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium: equilibria which do not involve the use of weakly 
dominated strategies. This result is obtained in a private values model in 
which agents are incompletely informed about the preferences of other agents. 
The restrictions we impose are that no agent is ever completely indifferent 
over all alternatives and that there are at least three agents. We do not 
require a "no veto power" condition (as in e.g. Maskin [1977] and Abreu and 
Sen [1986]). The proof consists of augmenting a direct mechanism and 
specifying outcomes so that a given incentive compatible allocation is the 
unique equilibrium outcome to the game. 
Our possibility result stands in sharp contrast to previous results on 
implementation with incomplete information. Palfrey and Srivastava [1985],
extending the earlier analysis of Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986], show that 
a condition called Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for implementation in 
(unrefined) Bayesian Nash equilibrium. As shown in Palfrey and Srivastava 
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(1987], most "nice" allocations do not satisfy this condition even if the 
domain of application is restricted to the set of pure exchange economies. In 
Section IV of this paper, we provide the even more striking example of an 
allocation which is implementable in dominant strategies but not in Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium. 
With complete information, several positive results have been obtained. 
Maskin (1977] showed that a condition termed monotonicity is necessary for 
Nash implementation and that together with a no veto power condition and at 
least three agents, is also sufficient (Saijo (1985]). Monotonicity is 
satisfied by many economically interesting� of allocations. For example, 
the correspondence which associates each pure exchange neoclassical economy 
with the set of Pareto optimal redistributions is monotonic, as is the 
(constrained) Walrasian correspondence. However, most allocations (i.e. 
single valued correspondences) are not monotonic, and thus not Nash 
implementable. Moore and Repullo [1986] (see also Abreu and Sen [1986) ) show 
that the class o� implementable allocations expands significantly if the 
mechanism is played sequentially and subgame perfection is imposed on the 
equilibrium. Palfrey and Srivastava [1986] show that if there are at least 3 
players and complete indifference is ruled out, then all allocations are 
implementable in Nash equilibrium if weakly dominated strategies are not 
used, This paper is then an extension of our previous results to incomplete 
information. What is surprising is that our previous results extend in a 
straightforward manner, in contrast to the failure of positive Nash 
implementation results to extend to Bayesian Nash implementation (Palfrey and 
Srivastava [1987]).
Our general possibility result with private values does not extend easily 
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to common value models or to models in which an agent's type only indexes the 
agent's information about other agents. We derive a necessary condition for 
unique implementation in general models and provide an example with common 
values, both of which highlight the difficulties arising in these situations 
and which indicate that positive results in this domain will be more limited. 
The private values model is described in the next section, 1-.hile the 
central possibility result is presented in Section 3. These results are 
compared to implementation with (unrefined) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in 
Section 4 .  General domains (e.g. common values) are considered in Section 5.
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2. The Hodel 
We employ the widely used private values model in which agents are 
incompletely informed about the preferences of other agents. There are I 
agents, and Ti denotes the set of possible types for agent i. A type for 
agent i, ti, specifies the preferences of i and also i's information about 
other agents. A is an arbitrary set of alternatives, and Ui( ., ti) the utility 
function of agent i if he is of type ti E Ti. Let T - T
1xT2 x ... xTI. An 
allocation is a function x : T � A. Let 
X - { x: T � A ) 
be the set of all allocations. 
Each agent is assumed to know his own type but not necessarily that of any 
other agent. The prior distribution over types is given by a distribution q 
on T. Given a type ti for i, we denote by qi(t.i jti) the posterior 
distribution of i over the types of the other agents. To simplify notation, we 
make a no moving support assumption, i. e. that support(qi(tijt.i)) - Ti for 
all i and t. This implies that the type of any agent is purely private 
information in the sense that even by pooling the information of all agents 
except i, i's type cannot be determined exactly. 
Given an allocation x E X, the expected utility to i is denoted by 
Vi(x, ti) - J Ui(x(t.i,ti)•ti)dqi(t.ilti). 
Definition 1: A mechanism is a pair (M,g), M - M1x M2 x . .. xMI and g 
Mi is the message space of i, while g is the outcome function. 
Definition 2: A strategy for agent i is a function ui: Ti �Mi. 
M �A. 
Given a strategy a, we denote by g(a) the outcome generated by a, where the 
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outcome at t is g(a(t)). The question being posed in this paper can now be 
formulated precisely: given an equilibrium concept and an allocation, does 
there exist a mechanism which has x as its unique equilibrium outcome ? 
Following the implementation literature, if there exists such a mechanism, we 
say that the allocation is implementable. 
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3. Undomlnated Bayesian Equilibrium 
In this section, we study the implementation question using Bayesian 
equilibria which do notr involve the use of weakly dominated strategies. We 
show that any al l ocation which satisfies the standard incentive compatibility 
condition can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism in a large 
class of models. 
Let a-i - (a1, • • •  ,ai-l,ai+l,,,, ,aI), so a - (a-i,ai), 
Definition 3: 
(i) ai is a best response for i to a-i if for'all ti, 
Vi(g(a-i ,ai),ti) � Vi(g(a-i .�i),ti) for all �i : Ti � Mi 
(ii) a is a Bayesian equilibrium if ai is a best response to a-i for all i. 
Definition 4:  a is weakly dominated if there exists i, ti and qi : Ti � Mi 
such that Vi(g(a-i,�i),ti) � Vi(g(�-i,ai),ti) for all �-i with strict 
inequality for some a-i. 
This says that no matter what strategies are used by the others, agent i does 
at least as well by using qi instead of ai, and for some strategy combination 
of the others, he does strictly better. 
Definition 5: a is an undominated Bayesian equilibrium if a is a Bayesian 
equil ibrium and a is not weakly dominated. 
It is clear that any allocation which can be made the unique equilibrium 
outcome to a mechanism must satisfy an incentive compatibility condition. 
This is immediate from the literature on Bayesian incentive compatibility 
(e.g. Myerson (1979], Harris and Townsend (1981]) . 
Definition 6: x: T �A is incentive compatible if for all i, for all ti, 
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We state the foll owing well known result for completeness. 
Theorem 1: If x is implementable then x is incentive compatible. 
The next definition summarizes a restriction on the environment. It says 
that there are no redundant preference-types for any agent in the sense that 
types index preferences. 
Definition 7 (Value-Distinguished types): For all i, t1, ti, t1 - ti, either 
there exist y1,z1 EA with U
1(y1,ti) � U
1(z',t1) and U1(y1,t{ ) < U1(zi,t{ ) or 
there exist yl,zl EA with Ul(y
1,t1) > U'(zi,t1) and U'(y',t { ) � U1(z1,t{ ). 
In some applications, value distinction may require us to consider random 
all ocations. This will be the case if, for example, the difference between 
types is difference in risk aversion. In this case, types are value 
distinguished on the set of l otteries over A. 
Our sufficiency result requires us to also impose the fol lowing mild 
restrictions on the domain of possible types. 
Definition 8: 
(i) (No Complete Indifference) For all i, t1, there exists a, b EA with 
U1(a,t1) > U1(b,t1). 
(ii) (Existence of best and worst elements) For all i, t1, there exist 
b(t1), w(t1) EA with U1(b(t1),t1) � U1(a,t1) V a  EA and U1(a,t1) � 
U1(w(t1),t1) V a  EA. 
Theorem 2: Assume I � 3, no complete indifference, the existence of best and 
worst el ements, and that types are value distinguished. If x is incentive 
compatible, then x can be made the unique undominated Bayesian equil ibrium 
outcome to a mechanism. 
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Proof: We construct a mechanism for the case of strictly value distinguished 
types, i.e. ti ;0 t; implies there exist y1(ti,t;) EA and y2(ti,t;) 
EA with Ui(y1(ti,t;),ti) > Ui(y2(ti,t;),ti) and U
i(y1(ti,t;),t;) < 
Ui(y2(ti,t;) ,t;). Straightforward methods for extending the mechanism to 
account for indifference in value distinction are contained in Palfrey and 
Srivastava (1986]. Let 
M1 - Mi x Mi x Mi
 x Mi where 1 3 4 
Mi 1 - Ti 
Mi 2 - � TJ 
Mi 3 = [0,!+2) 
Mi 4 - A. 
In the appendix, we prove that the outcome function can be defined so that 
the only undominated Bayesian equilibrium is of the type ui(ti) -(ti,ti,O,bi) 
for all i and t, where bi is a best element for i at ti. Here, we give the 
intuition behind the construction of the mechanism and how it works. The 
allocation rule, g, is, effectively, a direct mechanism almost everywhere in 
M .  B y  this w e  mean that, except for specific isolated portions o f  M ,  g only 
uses the information contained in the first component of everyone's message. 
Calling this region, R0, we have g(m) - x(m1) V m E R0• The remainder of M is 
divided into regions indexed by i. In these regions, m� - ti E Ti for all 
j;Ji. The allocation rule for such a region, denoted Ri• is given in the 
following table, 
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Message of Agent i 
Message of all j ;J i (ti, ti ,0,
ai) (ti,t;,ki,ai) (ti,ti,ki,ai), ki>O 
or (ti,tJ,ki,ai), j;Ji 
(tJ, ti ,kJ ,aJ) 
ai ai w(ti) 
kj E (I+l, I+2) 
(tJ, t;,kJ ,aJ) 
Y1 (ti,t;) Yz(ti,t;) a*(k) 
kJ E (I+l, I+2) 
(tJ, t�',kJ ,aJ) 
kj E (I+l,I+2) Y 1(ti,t�') ai a*(k) 
II (ti. t; l ti $. 
(tJ, ti ,kJ ,aJ) 
ai ai w(ti) 
kj E (i,i+l) 
(tJ,t;,kJ,aJ) 
kJ E (i,i+l) w( t �') w(t;) w(t;) 
t" .. t 
All other messages 
with m� - ti E Ti a*(k) a*(k) a*(k) 
Table 1 
Allocation rule restricted to region R1 
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We have denoted by a*(k) the outcome requested in m4 by the smallest j 
such that kJ � ki for all 1. The strategies for agent i are given by the 
columns of the matrix, while the strategies of all agents other than i are 
given by the rows. 
The initial step in the proof is to show that there is no equilibrium in 
Ri. Suppose agent i is of type ti. Note first that reporting mi-a with 
Ui(a,ti) < Ui(b(ti),ti) is weakly dominated; changing a to b(ti) is strictly 
better for i at several m.i ,  and, if the rest of mi is unaltered, i is never 
worse off. Without loss of generality, then, suppose mi - b(ti). 
Next, we note that there is no equilibrium with kJ > 0 for some j. To see 
this, suppose J s kJ < J+l for some nonegative integer JS I+l and k j � 0. 
Then, (ki + J+l)/2 weakly dominates, since j is strictly better off somewhere 
in the bottom row of the table and no worse off anywhere. 
A similar argument applies for i if k1 � 0 or if m� � mi . We conclude 
that all equilibria must lie in R0, with m� - 0 and mi - m� for all j. 
The next step is to observe that at t; , playing (t1,t1,0,b(t; )) with ti�ti 
is weakly dominated by (t 1,t;,ki,b(t;)). This change only alters the outcome 
in rows 2,3, and 6. In row 2, the outcome changes from y1(ti,t;) to 
y2(ti,t;). By construction, Ui(y2(ti,t ;),t;) > U1(y1(t 1,t;),t;), so i is 
better off. In rows 3 and 6, i is never worse off. 
Hence the only possible equilibrium is ai (ti) - (t1,t1,0,b(ti )) for all i, 
and ti. To see that this is indeed an undominated Bayesian equilibrium, we 
first note that incentive compatibility implies that when all j�i play aJ, ai 
is a best response for i, since a unilateral deviation by i can only change 
the outcome from x(t) to x(t.1 ,ti) at t. To se that it is not weakly 
dominated, we have to consider each possible deviation by i. These cases are 
covered in detail in the Appendix, and are easily checked by inspection of the 
table. 
To conclude, the only equilibria are ai(ti) - (ti ,ti,O,bi ) for all i and 
ti where bi is a best element at ti, and all these equilibria yield x as the 
outcome. Hence, this mechanism implements x. If some individual has more 
than one best element then there are multiple equilibria, but all equilibria 
produce x as the outcome. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategies are 
"interchangeable", since they only differ in the last component of the message 
space. 
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4. Unrefined Bayesian Equilibrium 
In this section, we compare the results of Section 3 with implementation 
using Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. It is shown in Palfrey 
and Srivastava (1985) that a necessary condition for unique implementation of 
an allocation can be written in terms of "deceptive" strategies. 
A deception by agent i is a function ai : Ti � Ti . The interpretation is 
that when i is of type ti, i acts as if he is of type a i(ti). In a direct
mechanism, the set of all possible a i is the set of strategies available to i, 
while truth telling by i is the identity ai, With this notation, incentive 
compatibility can be rewritten as : for all i, for all ti, 
f Ui(x(t.i,ti)•ti)dqi(t_i lti) � f Ui(x(t.i,a i(ti)),t1)dqi(t.ilti) 
for all a i : T i� T i, This is the standard incentive compatibility condition 
and says that if in a direct mechanism, all other agents are using truthful 
strategies, then the truthful strategy does at least as well for agent i as 
any deception. ,Notice that incentive compatibility does !!2..!: say what is a 
best response when other agents are playing deceitfully. Implementation 
essentially requires us to study which nontruthful a's can arise as 
equilibria. In contrast, Theorem 1 told us that, at least for a certain class 
of models, one can design mechanisms such that these alternative candidates 
for equilibrium rely on the use of dominated strategies. The following 
condition characterizes those a's which will be sustained as Bayesian 
equilibria. 
Let a - (al• ... ,al)• a ·i - (al ,a2'. • '  ,ai -1 ,ai+l • .. • ,aI) so that a - (a· i ,ai). 
For any a, denote Xa(t) - x(a(t)). 
Definition 9:  x : T � A  satisfies Bayesian monotonicity if for any a such 
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that xa(t) � x(t) for some t, there exist i, ti• y : T � A  such that 
J Ui(x(t.i ,t;) ,t;)dqi(t.i It;) � J Ui(y(t.1 ,a1(ti)) ,t;)dq1(t.1 It;) for all ti' 
and J (xa(t.11ti),ti)dq1(t.1lt1) < f U1(Ya(t.1,t1>.t1)dq1(t.1lt1). 
It follows almost immediately that if x can be made the unique Bayesian 
equilibrium outcome to a mechanism, then it must satisfy Bayesian 
monotonicity. To see this suppose (M,g) implements x, and a is such that 
xa(t) � x(t) for some t. If a is a Bayesian equilibrium with g(a) - x, then 
we must have Vi(g(a·i ,ai),t�) � Vi (g(a·i,ai),t�) for all t� and for all ai. 
But aa, defined by a�(t i) - ui(a i(t i)) for all i and ti, cannot be an 
equilibrium, since g(aa) - Xa and Xa is not an equilibrium outcome. This 
implies there must exist some agent, say i, a message, mi, and some type for 
this agent, say t i, such that 
Vi (g(aai ,mi),ti) > Vi (g(aa),ti). 
Let y(t) - g(a"i(t), mi) for all t. Then, g(aa1 ,mi) - Ya while g(aa) - Xa so
we get f (xa(t.i,ti).ti)dq i(t.ilti) < f Ui(ya(t.i,ti).ti)dqi(t.ilti).
However, since ai is a best response to a·i, we must have 
f Ui(x(t.i,t;),t;)dqi(t.ilt;) � f Ui(y(t.i ,ai(ti)),t;)dqi(t.i It;) for all t;.
We conclude that Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for implementation.• 
The following example shows that most "nice" allocations do not satisfy 
Bayesian monotonicity. 
Example 1: I-3, A-(a,b), T i - (t.,tb) for all i. Types are independently drawn 
with [qi(tb)]2 > .5 for all i. Preferences are as follows: type t0 strictly 
prefers a to b, while type tb strictly preferes b to a. Normalize utility so 
Consider the following allocation, x : 
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2 is 
1 is � L:J_:J 1 is CD � 
This allocation has many nice properties and indeed, is the only reasonable 
allocation in that: 
(i) It is incentive compatible. 
(ii) It is ex-ante efficient, interim efficient, durable, and ex-post 
efficient in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson (1981].
(iii) x(t) is the (unique) majority winner at t, 
(iv) It maximizes an Arrow social welfare function. 
(v) It can be implemented in dominant strategies (and, of course, in 
tmdominated Bayesian equilibrium). 
Remarkably, x is not implementable in Bayesian equilibrium: let a i(t1) - tb
for all i, so x(a(t)) - b for all t. We show below that there do not exist i, 
y, and t 1 which satisfy the inequalities required by Bayesian monotonicity. 
Consequently, in� game in which u is a Bayesian equilibrium with g(u) - x, 
Ua is also a Bayesian equilibrium with g(u a) - Xa· This has severe welfare 
implications, as Xa • b violates (ii), (iii), and (iv). 
To show that Bayesian monotonicity is not satisfied requires us to prove 
that there does not exist y: T�A which satisfies the first set of inequalities 
in Definition 6, with Ya simultaneously satisfying the second inequality. To 
see this, note first that since a is a "projection" to tb, ya is a constant 
allocation. Furthermore, if y0(t) - b for all t, then Xa - Ya• in which case 
the second inequality could not be satisfied, so we can limit attention to y's 
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such that Ya(t) - a V t. Since a is the worst element for type tb, the 
inequality: 
- a. By our choice of y(tb,tb,tb), the second inequality of Definition 9 is 
satisfied for all i when i is type t.. We need to show that the other 
elements of y cannot be picked to satisfy the first inequality of Definition 
9 .  Since the problem is symmetric, we need consider only agent 1. The 
expected utility from x at t. is l-q(tb)2 while that from y(t_1,a1(t8)) at t8 
is: 
The minimum value of this last expression over y is q(tb)2, which is greater 
than l-q(tb)2, so the first inequality of Bayesian monotonicity must be 
violated when agent 1 is of type t.. Hence, x is not implementable.• 
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5. Extensions 
In this section, we discuss the assumptions underlying Theorem 1, and 
consider generalizations of our model. 
A. Common Values 
The most significant assumption in Theorem 1 is private values. Even 
though a large majority of applications to date of Bayesian games to economic 
problems and virtually all applications of the revelation principle to 
mechanism design have used this assumption, it is clearly a restrictive 
assumption. Curiously, our general possibility result does not apply with 
nearly the same force in settings with common values, as we now discuss. 
The model itself is easily modified to incorporate common values. To do 
this, we write the utility function of agent i at t as Ui( ·,t) instead of 
Ui( ·,ti), but still assume that at t, i observes only ti, and that there is no 
moving support. Incentive compatibility is now stated as follows. 
Definition 61: x is incentive compatible if for all i, for all ti, 
JUi(x(t_i,ti),t) Clqi(t_ijti) <!:: Jui(x(t_i1ti),t)dqi(t_ilti) for all ti E T i. 
Let Vi (y,ti) - fUi (y(t_i,ti),t)dq
i (t_i lti). The following theorem yields 
a necessary condition for implementing an allocation. 
Theorem 3: If x is implementable in undominated Bayesian equilibrium, then x 
is incentive compatible, and for any a:T � T, Xa(t) � x(t) for some t implies 
that at least one of the following conditions hold: 
(a) there exist i, ti, and y E X with 
J Ui(x(t_i,t;),t_i,t;)dq
1(t_1 lt;) <!:: J Ui(y(t_i,a i(ti)),t_1 ,t;)dqi(t_ilt;) 
for 0all t;eT 1 and 
Jui (xa (t_i 'ti)' t_i 'ti )dqi (t_i I ti) < J Ui <Ya(t_i 'ti)' t_i 'ti) dqi (t_i I ti).
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(b) there exist i, ti' and y1 , Yz· Z1 ' z2 E X with 
Vi (Y1 ,ai (ti)) > Vi (y z 'ai (ti ) ) 
Vi (Y1p• ti) :S Vi (yzp•ti) for 
Vi (z1 , ti) > Vi (z2 , ti) and 
Vi (z1p 1 ti) <!:: Vi ( Zz p' ti ) for 
(c) there exist i, ti, and y1 ,y2 E X with 
Vi(y1,ai (ti)) - Vi (yz,ai (ti)) 
and 
all deceptions p with pi 
all deceptionS p with pi 
- ai 
- ai 
Vi (Y1 'ti) 
Vi (Y1p' ti) 
See Appendix. 
< Vi (yz 'ti) 
:S Vi (YzP• ti) for all deceptions p with pi - ai . 
With private values, parts (b) and (c) of this result reduce to the 
statement that types are value distinguished. For example, consider (b). In 
this case, we must have Ui(y1(t_i ,ti),ti) > Ui(y2(t_i ,ti), ti) for some t_i 
where t; - a i(ti). Now, consider p-i(t:i) - t_i for all t�i• yielding 
Ui(y1(t_i,ti),t;) :S_Ui(y2(t_i,ti)t;), which says that ti and ti are value
distinguished. The assumption of no complete indifference yields the 
existence of z1 and z 2  satisfying the requirements of the condition. 
Except in private values models, conditions (b) and (c) appear to be very 
strong, in fact sufficiently strong that they seem unlikely to be satisfied in 
general applications. This suggests that undominated Bayesian implementation 
is essentially equivalent to (unrefined) Bayesian implementation once one 
moves beyond private value domains with value-distinguished types. 
The following example, which is a variant of our earlier example, 
illustrates the difficulties arising with common values. 
Example 2: A - {a,b), I - 3, Ti - {t8,tb) Vi, and types are independently 
18 
drawn with (q i (th)) z > , 5 for all i. The agents have "maj oritarian"
preferences, given by 
Ui(a,t) 
-
{ � i£ at least 2 agents are type t. otherwise 
i£ at least 2 agents are type th 
otherwise. 
With this structure of preferences, all agents are ex-post identical. The 
following incentive compatible allocation, x, is (uniquely) efficient in all 
senses and for each t, picks out the unanimous socially preferred outcome: 
2 is 2 is 
t. tb t. tb 
t. a I a t. a b I 1 is 1 is tb a b tb b b 
3 is t. 3 is tb 
Surprisingly, thi13 allocation is not implementable in undominated Bayesian 
equilibrium. To see this, consider a1(t1) - th for all i, so xa(t) - b for all 
t, as in Example 1. We claim that for any mechanism, if x is an undominated 
Bayesian equilibrium outcome, then Xa is also an undominated Bayesian 
equilibrium outcome. A proof is given in the Appendix, 
B. Value distinguished types 
We turn next to the assumption of value distinguished types. This 
assumption rules out the case where an agent's type determines only his 
information about other agents. This case, of purely "information 
distinguished types" is not covered by Theorem 2. In fact, with private 
values, Theorem 3 reduces to saying that if x is implementable, then either x 
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must satisfy Bayesian monotonicity or types must be value distinguished. We 
are unaware of specific economic applications in the literature in which types 
are not value distinguished, though such problems have been studied in game 




The .main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in 
mechanism design can be solved in private value models, if 'ft6- players do not to 
use weakly dominated strategies. The result applies less generally to common 
value situations and to situations in \o.bich types are rot value distinguished. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 2: We divide the message space as follows. 
D!A - !ml mJ - (tJ ,ti ,kJ ,aJ) V j,..i, kJ E (I+l,I+2) V j,..i) 
mi - (ti , ti , 0, ai ) , ti ,.. ti l 
Dh - !ml mJ - (tJ,ti,kJ,aJ) V j,..i, kJ E [I+l,I+2) V j,..i,) 
mi - (ti , ti , 0, ai ) l 
otA - !ml mJ - (tJ ,ti ,kJ ,aJ) V j,..i, kJ E [I+l,I+2) V j,..i, 
mi - (ti , ti , ki , ai ) , ti ,.. t� l 
Dh - !ml mJ - (tJ,ti'.kJ,a� ) V j,..i, kJ E [I+l,I+2) V j,..i,
mi - (t i,tl,ki,ai), tl,.. tt', tl,.. ti) 
D3A - !ml mJ - (tJ,ti,kJ,aJ) V j,..i, kJ E [i,i+l) V j,..i,
mi - (ti , t{ , ki , ai ) , t{ ,.. ti , or mi - (ti , ti , 0, ai ) ) 
035 - !ml mJ - (tJ ,ti ,kJ ,aJ) V j,..i, kJ E [i,i+l) V j,..i,
mi ,.. (ti , t{ , ki , ai ) , t{ ,.. ti , and mi ,.. (ti , ti , 0, ai ) ) 
06 - .!all other m}. 
For m E 06, let i* be the smallest i such that m! � m� V j, and 
1 i'I'et ai* - m4, 
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The outcome function is given by 
x(t) if m E D1 
x(t) if m E Dz 
Y1 (ti,ti) if m E D!A 
ai if m E Dh 
g(m) - y2 (ti, ti) ifmED!,.. 
ai if m E D!B 
ai if m E D!,.. 
w(ti) if m E Dh 
ai* if m E Da 
We start by showing that ai(ti) - (ti,t1,0,b(ti)) is a Bayesian equilibrium. 
This can be seen by noting that a unilateral deviation by i from from this 
strategy only affects the outcome if i changes mi. (Note: this would not be 
true if I-2, since in that case D2n(D!uD!)r'¢.) If, at ti, i instead reports mi 
- t; , the outcome at t is x(t_i,ti) instead of x(t_1,ti). Incentive 
compatibility now directly implies that a is a Bayesian equilibrium. 
Next, we argue that a is not weakly dominated. To see this, note first 
that not reporting a best element in the fourth component of the message is 
always weakly dominated, since the report in this component is always used in 
an agents favor. Without loss of generality, therefore, we assume that m! -
b(ti) for all i,ti, 
Next, we consider four possible types of deviations by i at ti and show 
that none of these deviations weakly dominates (ti,ti,0,b(ti)). 
(i) 
In this case, i is strictly worse off when mJ - (tJ,ti,i,ai) V j ,.. i since 
the outcome moves from b(ti) to w(ti). 
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v j ... i. 
(iii) j ... i. 
In this case, i is again strictly worse off when mJ - (tJ,ti,i,aJ) 
since the outcome changes from b(ti) to w(ti) 
v j ... i' 
(iv) mi - (ti,t; ,ki,b(ti)), t; ,.. ti. Here, i is strictly worse off when 
We conclude that a is an undominated Bayesian equilibrium, yielding x as the 
outcome. 
We now argue that there are no other equilibria, thereby concluding that x 
is the unique equilibrium outcome. This is argued in two steps : first, that 
all undominated equilibria are of the form ai(ti) - (t; ,t; ,O,b(ti)), and 
second, that t; ,.. ti is weakly dominated. 
First, note that there is no equilibrium at t with m!>O for some i. To 
see this, let J be an integer such that J � m! < J +l. Then, reporting mi - mi 
except m! - (m !+J+l)/2 weakly dominates reporting mi since there is a 
configuration of messages in D6 such that g(m-i ,mi) - w(ti) but g(m-i ,mi ) -
m!-b(ti), and no configuration of messages such that Ui(g(m),ti) > 
Ui(g(m-i,fili),ti). Second, ai(ti) - (ti,tJ,O,b(ti)) and a
i(ti) -
(ti,ti' ,O,b(ti)) for ti,.. ti' are both weakly dominated by the same argument. 
This only leaves a i(ti) 
The outcome only 
so i is strictly better off since Ui(y2(ti,ti), ti)> Ui(y1 (ti,ti),ti). 
is clear that i is no worse off in D6• 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2. • 
24 
It 
Proof of Theorem 3: The revelation principle implies x is incentive 
compatible. Let (M,g) implement x, let a be an equilibrium with g(a) - x, and 
let Xa ,. x for some a .  Then, aa, yielding Xa as the outcome, is not an 
undominated Bayesian equilibrium. Two cases arise : either aa is not a 
Bayesian equilibrium or it is one. In the first case the argument showing 
Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for Bayesian implementation yields (a). 
Suppose, then, that aa is a Bayesian equilibrium. Then, it must be weakly 
dominated, so there exist i, ti, and if1 such that 
for all o--i with strict inequality holding for some u-i. Note that a i(ti) ,. 
t 1, since otherwise, otr (ti ) - a 
i( t i) , "*iich would imply that a is "Neakly 
dominated, a contradiction. 
Since a is not weakly dominated at ai(ti), we get either 
or 
for all 11-i. 
Consider case (i), and let if1(ti) - a1(a1(t1)) for all ti. Then, letting y1 -
Further, for any deception P with pi - a 1, we must have V1(Yip,t 1) s 
V1(y2p,t1), since Yip is the outcome when all agents except i play ap-i and i 
plays a� while y2p is the outcome when all j,.i play ap-i and i plays if1. To 
complete case (i), it must also be the case that Vi(g(a-i,u-i),ti) > 
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Vi(z1 ,ti) > Vi(z2 ,ti). Repeating the argument above, we get Vi(z1 p,ti) � 
Vi(z2p,ti ) for all p with pi - a i. 
We have thus shown that there exist i, ti, Yi• y2 , z1 , z2 such that 
Vi (yip' ti) 
Vi (z i' ti) 
s Vi(Y2 p•ti) 
> Vi(z2 , ti) 
� Vi(z2 P• ti). 
for any deception p with pi - a i, 
for any deception p with pi - a i 
This is precisely the requirement in (b). 
Consider next case (ii). Here, 
for all u-i .  Since ui weakly dominates ah, w e  must have 
Vi(g(ap-i,if1),ti) � Vi(g(ap-i,ah),ti) for all p with pi - ai. 
Letting y2 - g(O-i ,ai), Yi - g(u-i ,ah), we get 
Vi(yl,ti) 
Vi (yip, ti) 
< Vi(y2 , ti) 
s Vi(Y2 P• ti) 
and 
for any deception p with pi - a i. 
This is the requirement in (c), and concludes the proof.• 
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Proof of Claim in Example 2: We prove the claim in two parts. 
Part I: If a is a Bayesian equilibrium to (M,g) with g(a) - x, the aa is a 
Bayesian equilibrium. 
Part II: If a is an undominated Bayesian equilibrium to (M,g), with g(a) - x, 
then aa is undominated. 
Proof of Part I: Suppose everyone except i uses the strategy u·i - a"1(tb) 
regardless of type. Then, the outcome depends (at most) only upon i's type. 
Regardless of i's type, i prefers b to a since the others are likely .to both 
be t b's. Hence ui - a1(tb) regardless of i's type is a best response to u·i ·• 
Proof of Part II: This is more involved, and requires meticulous checking 
that none of the conditions (a), (b), or (c) of Theorem 2 are satisfied. 
Since part (I) of the proof already implies that (a) is not satisfied, we need 
only show that (b) and (c) are not satisfied. In this simple example, (c) is 
Therefore the proof reduces to showing that (b) is not satisfied. That is: 
lhere does not exist a pair of allocations, y1,y2 such that 
(*) 
This can be proven in a series of steps. 
First, without loss of generality, fix i-3. 
� :  I t  suffices t o  show that there do not exist allocations y: T -3 � A
(i.e. allocations which are constant in player 3's type) such that V3(y1,tb) > 
Proof: This follows immediately from the fact that both inequalities of (*) 
hold the argument of y1 and y2 corresponding to player 3's type fixed at th.• 
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Thus we are reduced to a search of all pairs y1 and y2 which can be 
represented by 2x2 outcome matrices, as below. 
Player l's 
type 




Player 2's type 
t. 
Yz 
The remainder of the proof involves a demonstration that there is no way to 
fill in the above matrices with a' s and b' s in such a way that (*) is 
satisfied. 
Step 2: If some entry in y 2 is a, the corresponding entry in y1 is a (i.e. 
. . 
Proof: Suppose y2(t.1) - a but y1(t.1) - b for some t.1• Then the second 
inequality of (*) is violated for the 13·1 which projects to t .1 (i.e. 13"1(t.1) 
- t ·i v t.i) .• 
Proof: If not, then y1 - y2 so the first inequality of (*) violated.• 
Proof: 
Suppose y2 (t0,t0) -a .  Then by step 2, y1(t8,t8) - a, and by step 3 there 









(I) violates the second inequality of (*) for P.1 given by 
pl: pl ( t.) - tb pl ( tb) - t. (Player 1 (row) flips) 
p2 : p2 ( t.) - t. p2 (tb) - t. (Player 2 (column) projects to t0) 
Similarly, (II) violates the second inequality of (*) for P -i given by 
pl (t.) - t. pl (tb) - t. (Player 1 (row) projects to t.) 
p2 ( t.) - tb p2 (tb) - t. (Player 2 (column) flips) 
To see that (III) cannot occur, we know from (I) and (II) that the (III) case 
must be 
Y2 
This violates the second inequality of (*) for P-i given by 
Hence, y2(t8,t8) r a, 
Similar arguments may be used to show that 
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Proof: If not, then y1 - y2 .• 
Proof: Suppose y1 (t0,t0) - a. Then it is easy to show that y1 (t8,tb) - a and 
(tb, t0) - a, by arguments as in cases (I) and (II) of step 4. In fact, if 
y1 (t.1) - a for any t-i• then we must have y1 (t.1) - a for "adjacent" t.1 (i.e. 
t ·i and t.1 differ in only one component). Hence Step 6 follows almost 
immediately from Steps.• 
Steps 1-6 imply that y1 (t.1) - a and y2 (t.1) - b for all t.1. However, this 
violates the first inequality of (*). Therefore, there do rot exist any 
(y1 ,y2 ) pairs satisfying (*) so x is not implementable.• 
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